



## **Incentives to Cooperate in Teams**

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This paper focuses on the implicit and explicit incentives to cooperate in teams. Using the information from a French matched employer / employee survey on computerisation and organisational change (COI), we identify some crucial dimensions of teamwork and assess their impact on cooperation among colleagues and hourly salary. The dimensions we identify relate to the prediction of theoretical models on cooperation in teams. According to the theoretical literature, cooperation in teams can arise from the use of external incentives (external monitoring, performance evaluation, use of team-based rewards) but also from the use of implicit incentives. Following Che and Yoo (2001) we identify the following implicit incentives that can act as mechanisms to foster cooperation in teams: long-term repeated interactions with co-workers, peer monitoring, work mutual dependence, autonomy to decide the workload and divide the tasks of the team.

The research questions we address are: Do workers tend to help each other more in teams than if they work individually? Does the definition of the team (types of implicit incentives at work) matter for this result, i.e. is there any difference in cooperation across teams that rely on different implicit/explicit incentives? What is the interplay between explicit and implicit incentives? Do explicit incentives tend to crowd out or to enhance implicit incentives (by providing a means to punish deviations from cooperation)? Does cooperation vary with the team size? Does this "size effect" differ depending on the definition of the team? How is hourly salary affected by the different dimensions of teamwork?

We find important differences in the role of the different dimensions of team work on cooperation. Moreover, the size of the team does not exhibit a linear and negative effect on cooperation.